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Tufts and Millar: Two New Views of the Crane Case
and Its Famous Footnote
JeroldA. Friedland*
I. Introduction
No case has had a greater impact on the tax law than Crane v.
Commzsioner.t The decision, which was instrumental in the creation
2
of highly-leveraged, no-risk tax shelters, has generated commentary
and controversy for nearly thirty-five years. Recent decisions by different United States Courts of Appeals 3 dealing with the meaning of
what has been called "the most famous footnote in tax history" 4 indicate that the controversy is alive and well. These decisions about the
applicability of Crane's footnote 37 illustrate a fundamental disagreement about the rationale and scope of the entire Crane holding. This
article will examine the reasons for that disagreement.
When Crane was before the Supreme Court of the United States,
Chief Justice Vinson posed the issue in a disarmingly simple way:
"The question here is how a taxpayer who acquires depreciable property subject to an unassumed mortgage, holds it for a period, and
finally sells it so encumbered must compute her taxable gain." 5 Actually, the issue framed by the Chief Justice did not quite reflect the
case before the Court nor the scope of its eventual decision. Crane
dealt only with the sale of property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage where the value of the property was greater than the principal
on the mortgage. In such circumstances, the Court believed that the
*

Assistant Professor, DePaul University, College of Law. B.A., M.A., New York Uni-

versity; J.D., Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., Georgetown University.
1 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
2 A number of excellent articles explore many aspects of Crane. Among them are: Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundariesof the Crane Doctrine: An Imaginagr Supreme Court Opinion, 21
TAx L. REv. 159 (1966); Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L.
REv. 277 (1978); Del Cotto, Basis andAmount Realized Under Crane: A Current View ofSome Tax
Eects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1969); Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53
TAXES 719 (1975); McGuire, Negative Capital Accounts and the Failing Tax Shelter, 3 J. REAL
ESTATE TAX. 439 (1976); Weiss, The Crane Case Updated, 32 TAx LAw. 289 (1979).
3 Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978);
Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), revo 70 T.C. 756 (1978).
4 Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt and the Crane Case, 33 TAx L. REv. 277 (1978)
(hereinafter cited as Bittker, Tax Shelters).
5 331 U.S. at 2.
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tax consequences should be the same as if there were personal liability for the loan:
We are.

. .

concerned with the reality that an owner of property,

mortgaged at a figure less than than at which the property will sell,
must and will treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they
were his personal obligations. If he transfers subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substantial as if the mortgage
were discharged, or as if a6 personal debt in an equal amount had
been assumed by another.
Since it was well established that the discharge of a personal obligation resulted in taxable gain, 7 the consequences should be the same
for transfers of nonrecourse debt. Thus, the amount realized included the full amount of the mortgage.
The Court made it clear that its holding was limited to cases
where the value of the property exceeded the mortgage. Annexed to
its statement that a nonrecourse mortgagor in such circumstances
"realizes a benefit in the amount of the mortgage" was the now famous footnote 37:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of
the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the
property or transferred subject to the mortgage without receiving
boot. This is not this case.8
The meaning of footnote 37, however, has been somewhat less than
obvious, at least to the lower courts. The basic uncertainty about the
footnote is whether it was intended to create an exception to the
principal holding of Crane with respect to the amount realized on the
discharge of nonrecourse debt, or merely to reserve that issue for future decisions. In Tufts v. Commissioner,9 the Fifth Circuit recently decided that the footnote does indeed create an exception to Crane. The
Tus court held that "the fair market value of the property securing
a nonrecourse debt limits the extent to which the debt can be included in the amount realized on disposition of the property." 10 The
court was quite blunt about its reason for following footnote 37; it
thinks the Crane case was wrongly decided. As the opinion sums up:
"Because we have serious reservations about the Crane decision, we
6 Id. at 14.
7

United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938).

8 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
9 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).

10 Id. at 1063.
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decline to extend it beyond the facts of that case.""
On the other side of the footnote are the Tax Court (which was
reversed in Thfts),1 2 the Third Circuit' 3 and probably the Second
Circuit,' 4 which have decided that whatever implications can be

drawn from the note must be disregarded. Interestingly, the thrust of
the arguments made by these courts is not that the statement is mere
dictum in a lowly footnote, but that it is wrong and entirely inconsistent with the principal rationale for the Crane decision. Crane is
viewed as having established a judicial "tax benefit" rule which prevents the abuses that would result if nonrecourse debt could be used
to provide high basis property and generous tax losses without any
counterbalancing gain upon disposition of the property.
While Tufts was on appeal to the Fifth Circuit from the Tax
Court, the Internal Revenue Service attempted to elevate their position in the case to the status of regulations. ' The new regulations
were adopted as final in December 1980, and not surprisingly, go
beyond the courts in disregarding footnote 37. 16Without any discussion of tax benefit or any other rationale, the regulations declare that
"the amount realized from a sale or other disposition of property includes the amount of liabilities from which the transferor is discharged as a result of the sale or disposition.' 7 Although the
majority's opinion in Tufts ignored the existence of these regulations,
Judge Williams made it clear in his concurring opinion that he
8
thinks them invalid.'
11 IId
12 Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656 (1977), a'din part, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756 (1978), rez'd, 651 F.2d 1058
(5th Cir. 1981); Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979).
13 Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
14 Estate of Levine v. Commissioner,634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980).
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980). This new section of the regulations includes in amount
realized any liabilities included in basis. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1001-2(a)(1), -2(a)(4) (1980).
16 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(b) (1980) provides:
The fair market value of the security at the time of sale or disposition is not relevant
for purposes of determining under paragraph (a) of this section the amount of liabilities from which the taxpayer is discharged. Thus, the fact that the fair market
value of the property is less than the amount of the liabilities it secures does not
prevent the full amount of those liabilities from being treated as money received
from the sale or other disposition of the property. However, see paragraph (a)(2) of
this section for a rule relating to certain income from discharge of indebtedness.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(4) (1980) provides: "For purposes of this section (i) The sale or other disposition of property that secures a nonrecourse liability discharges the transferor from the liability."
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(1) (1980).
18 Judge Williams wrote:
I concur with the result reached by our panel because the Commissioner's position
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The differences of opinion in this area are of more than academic interest. The disagreement between the courts goes to the very
heart of the Crane decision, which in turn goes to the heart of much of
the tax law governing property transactions. The Service's new regulations go beyond any theory proffered by any court and may indeed
be invalid, as Judge Williams suggests. Declining real estate values
coupled with more liberal depreciation allowances make the fact pattern envisioned by the footnote more likely to arise. In light of these
factors, it is once again time for a foray into the realm of Crane.
II. The Crane Decision
Although this article is mainly concerned with the ramifications
of footnote 37, the decisions in which the footnote has been an issue
can only be understood in terms of the rationale that the deciding
courts perceived to be the basis of Crane. The facts of the case are
relatively simple. The taxpayer inherited from her husband an
apartment building and lot which was subject to a mortgage for
which she had no personal liability. The value of the property when
she inherited it was just equal to the balance on the mortgage. The
taxpayer operated the building for seven years, claiming substantial
depreciation deductions on her tax returns. These deductions were
computed by using the fair market value of the building at her husband's death as the adjusted basis, undiminished by the outstanding
liability. Faced with an imminent foreclosure because of arrearage
on the debt, the taxpayer sold the property to a third party who took
it subject to the mortgage. The taxpayer was also paid a relatively
small amount of cash in the transaction.
Since the problem that the Court posed for itself was to compute
the amount of the taxpayer's gain in these circumstances, the Court
first had to determine the adjusted basis for the property and then
the amount realized on the sale. The basis of property acquired from
a decedent is ordinarily the fair market value of "such property" on
is inconsistent with the plain language of I.R.C. § 1001(b) and I.R.C. § 752(c). I
part company with the majority opinion because it rests on a difference of opinion
with the Service over the construction of § 1001 in light of the Crane doctrine. I
doubt we have authority to strike down the Commissioner's interpretation on the
basis of "serious reservations about the Crane decision." We are authorized, however, to invalidate administrative regulations that conflict with the statute on which
they purport to be based.
651 F.2d at 1063-64 (Williams, J., concurring).
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the date of death. 19 The question raised in Crane was whether "such
property" referred to the full value of the underlying asset or only to
the equity inherited (the value less the liabilities). After much discussion, the Court concluded that the "proper basis.

. .

is the value of

'20
the property, undiminished by mortgages thereon.
The Court also concluded that the amount realized on the sale
included the full amount of the nonrecourse mortgage liability that
was transferred with the property. Since the taxpayer's basis had
been adjusted downward by some $25,000 due to accumulated depreciation deductions while the mortgage principal remained constant, the sale resulted in a substantial amount of taxable income.
The Court was unimpressed by the taxpayer's contention that she
was being taxed on a transaction that was "by all dictates of common
2
sense . . . a ruinous disaster."1 '

A.

The Basis Holding

Why did the Court feel compelled to include the full amount of
the fair market value in the property's adjusted basis? Although the
decision offers several rationales, including a dictionary definition of
"property" and the Service's consistent administrative construction
of that word, it has been suggested that the "controlling force"
22
behind Crane was the Court's concern about depreciation policy.
This view appears well supported. The Internal Revenue Code requires the basis for computing depreciation to be the same as the
basis for computing gain or loss on a sale or exchange.23 Because the
depreciation deduction is an allowance for the actual exhaustion, or
wear and tear of property as it is used in a trade or business, depreciation must account for the declining value of the property, not
merely the owner's equity. Therefore, the Court concluded that the
use of an equity basis would be contrary to "implicit principles of
income tax depreciation.

'24

The taxpayer argued that it was not necessary to equate her basis for depreciation with her basis on a sale or exchange because she
should never have been allowed to take the depreciation deductions
at all. Since depreciation is allowable only to the taxpayer who actu19

I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1).

20

331 U.S. at 11.

21 Id. at 15.
22 See Del Cotto, Basis andAmount Realized Under Crane- A Current View of Some Tax Efects
in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (1969).
23 I.R.C. § 167(g).
24 331 U.S. at 10.
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ally bears the loss of capital through exhaustion of property, the nonrecourse nature of the liability would cause such losses to fall on the
mortgagee. Surprisingly, the Court did not reject this argument as a
matter of law, but held rather that the taxpayer had not established
her "factual premise."'25 Because the value of the property was never
shown to be less than the amount of the mortgage, a decline in the
value of the property could not be considered borne by the mortgagee. The fact that the buyer was willing to pay the taxpayer some
cash "boot" in addition to taking the building subject to the liability
allowed the Court to infer that the value of the property was always
26
at least equal to the mortgage.
But would a decline in value to less than the mortgage actually
shift the loss to the mortgagee? Perhaps the converse of that question
is more pertinent. Could the nonrecourse mortgagor be denied depreciation deductions when the value of the property is less than the
mortgage? There is an indication that this situation was not beyond
the Court's contemplation: "So long as the mortgagor is in possession the mortgagee cannot take depreciation deductions, even if he is
the one who actually sustains the capitalloss, as section [167] allows these
only on property used in the trade or business." 27 Ultimately, the
Court dodged the issue in a statement quite similar in tone to the
later footnote 37:
Whatever may be the rule as to allowing depreciation to a mortgagor on property in his possession which is subject to an unassumed
not faced with
mortgage and clearly worth less than the lien, we are
28
that problem and see no reason to decide it now.
B.

The Amount Realized Holding

The most perplexing aspect of Crane is the Court's rationale for
including in the seller's amount realized the amount of nonrecourse
debt that the property was subject to when sold. The Code defines
this amount realized as the sum of the money and the value of the
property received on the sale. 29 Where the sale is accompanied by an
assumption or payment of the seller's personal obligation, the
amount realized includes the amount of the debt from which the
25
26
27
28
29

Id at 11.
Id at 12.
Id at 10 n.28 (emphasis added).
Id at 12.
I.R.C. § 1001(b).
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seller is relieved.3 0 The purchaser's payment of the personal obligation is clearly equivalent to a direct payment to the seller. But, if the
purchaser pays or assumes an amount for which the seller had no
personal liability, the issue is whether this is also equivalent to a direct payment to the seller.
The Court assured us that there is such an equivalence f the
value of the property exceeds the amount of the mortgage. United
States v. Hendler31 was cited to establish that the amount realized is
not based solely on the receipt of money or property but upon
whether the taxpayer is the "beneficiary" of a payment in "as real
and substantial [a sense] as if the money had been paid to it and then
paid over by it to its creditors. '32 The opinion then concludes that
the transfer of a nonrecourse debt, when the value of the property
exceeds the mortgage, yields precisely such a "benefit. ' 33 But in Hendler the benefit to the taxpayer arose from the discharge of a personal
liability, that is, of an amount the taxpayer would otherwise be required to pay itself. This distinction is negated by equating nonrecourse debts with those carrying personal liability. The Crane Court
was convinced of the "reality that an owner of property, mortgaged
at a figure less than that at which the property will sell, must and will
treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations. '34 Thus, when the taxpayer transfers property
subject to a nonrecourse debt, "the benefit to him will be as real and
substantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal
'35
debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another.
C.

The ConstitutionalArgument

Having disposed of the taxpayer's arguments about adjusted basis and amount realized, the Crane Court addressed her final contention: that the Service's position was not permitted by the
Constitution. The "gain" being taxed, she maintained, was merely a
tax concept, and therefore beyond the authority granted to the Congress by the sixteenth amendment to tax amounts that are actually
"income. '36 Mrs. Crane wondered, as have many readers of the
Court's opinion since, how the sale of a property which never gener30
31
32

United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1937).
303 U.S. 564 (1937).
331 U.S. at 13.

33

Id

at 14.

34 Id
35 Id
36 Id at 15.
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ated enough income to pay the interest on the mortgage, and which
was sold under threat of foreclosure for $3,000 (less $500 expenses of
sale), could be considered to yield almost $25,000 in taxable
"income."
But the taxpayer's $3,000 in equity at the time of the sale was
not held to be the appropriate standard for measuring income. The
Court was more concerned about the substantial depreciation deductions taken by the taxpayer over all the years she owned the property.
These deductions were allowed, at least in theory, for the physical
exhaustion and consequent decline in value that the building could
be expected to experience. But the price paid by the purchaser indicated that this decline in value had not actually occurred and that
the taxpayer had not sustained a loss on the property equal to the
deductions allowed her. The Court concluded its opinion on this
note:
The crux of this case, really, is whether the law permits her to exclude allowable deductions from consideration in computing gain.
We have already shown that if it does, the taxpayer can enjoy a
double deduction, in effect, on the loss of the same assets. The Sixteenth Amendment
does not require that result any more than does
37
the Act itself.

III. Millar
Considering the impact of the decision on the tax law, especially
in providing a modus operandi for the tax shelter industry, Crane has
generated surprisingly little litigation. One reason for this scarcity
may be that tax practitioners simply do not include any gain in their
clients' returns when a tax shelter is disposed of.38 Reliance is placed
upon a literal reading of footnote 37 for the proposition that the
Crane holding is limited to situations where the taxpayer receives
cash or other boot.39
After Crane, there were indications that some courts would not
37
38
39

Id at 15-16.
See Bittker, Tax Shelters, supra note 4, at 277.
Some recent commentators have expressed agreement with this position:

Until the law is clarified by court decision or legislation, the uncertainty appears to
justify . . . taking the position that footnote 37 of Crane supports the proposition

that a transferor of property . . . subject to a nonrecourse note does not realize
income in an amount greater than the fair market value of property.
McGuire, Negative CapitalAccounts and the Failing Tax Shelter, 3 J. REAL EST. TAx. 439, 453
(1976). See also Handler, Tax Consequences of MortgageForeclosuresand Transfers ofReal Properly to
the Mortgagee, 31 TAx LAw REv. 193, 223 (1976). But see Weiss, The Crane Case Updated, 32

TAX LAW. 289, 311 (1979), where the demise of the footnote may have been prematurely
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be inclined to follow the footnote's implication. 40 In 1976 the Service
published a ruling which appeared to reject the footnote without rationale. 4 1 However, the very first case to deal with the factual situation clearly envisioned by footnote 37 was Millar v. Commissioner,
which was first decided by the Tax Court 42 and later affirmed by the
43
Third Circuit.
The taxpayers in Millar were shareholders in a Subchapter S
corporation that had been organized by a business associate. The
corporation's stock had been issued to them at a time when it had no
value and they did not make any capital contribution or pay any
consideration for it. In order to provide working capital for the venture, the business associate advanced a number of loans, totalling
$500,000, to all the shareholders in proportion to their stockholdings.
The shareholders in turn contributed these borrowed funds to the
corporation. The loans were made to the shareholders on a demand,
nonrecourse basis and were secured solely by their stock. The corporation suffered net operating losses of almost $600,000 over a three
year period and the stock became virtually worthless.
Since this was a Subchapter S corporation, its net operating
losses passed through to the shareholders. 44 This resulted in substantial tax savings for the shareholders and also caused corresponding
reductions in the bases for their stock. The taxpayers did not report
any gain from the disposition of their stock in the foreclosure. They
relied upon Crane's footnote 37 as authority for their position since
the value of the stock was clearly less than the amount of the nonrecourse debt it secured.
The Third Circuit framed the issue succinctly: "We must determine . . . whether footnote 37 of Crane creates an exception to the
principal holding of Crane . . . ."45 The first question then is what

was the principal rationale behind Crane. For the answer, the court
heralded: "The footnote 37 implications which appeared to provide a basis for limiting the
amount of the gain have been uniformly rejected."
40 See Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 649 (1951), afd,198 F.2d 357'(2d
Cir. 1952); Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320 (1947); Mayerson v. Commissioner,
47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq., 1969-1 C.B. 21.
41 Rev. Rul. 111, 1976-1 C.B. 214. This ruling recites precisely the same facts and conclusion as are now found in an illustrative example of the new regulations. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1001-2(c) Example 7 (1980). See notes 14 & 15 supra. See also Rollyson, Recent Cases and
Rulings, 3 J. REAL EST. TAx. 495 (1976) for an excellent analysis of the ruling.
42 67 T.C. 656 (1977).
43 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978).
44 I.R.C. § 1374.
45 577 F.2d at 214.
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analyzed the portion of the Crane decision addressing the taxpayer's
constitutional argument. As previously noted, this discussion in
Crane was aimed at refuting the taxpayer's contention that she had
no "income" in a constitutional sense because there had been no actual or constructive receipt of money or property.4 6 It was in this
context that the Crane Court stated that the "crux" of the case concerned whether previous deductions taken against property must be
accounted for in computing gain upon the disposition of the
47
property.
The Millar court concluded that this concern about possible
double deductions reflected the "principal reasoning" of Crane.48 Applying this reasoning to the case before it, the court found that the
taxpayers used the borrowed funds to increase the bases for their
stock in the Subchapter S corporation which then permitted them to
claim large loss deductions. Therefore, the shareholders clearly recognized gain to the extent that the amount of the cancelled nonrecourse note exceeded their stock's basis (which of course had been
reduced to the extent that the corporate losses were deducted on their
individual returns). This result, the court maintained, was mandated
by Crane:
A finding that the taxpayers did not realize gain as a result of this
exchange, after having realized the full economic benefit of this
of
transaction, would entitle them to the type of double deductions
49
which the Supreme Court so clearly disapproved in Crane.
But doesn't footnote 37 create an exception to this principal reasoning when the amount of the nonrecourse debt exceeds the value of
the property? Although the court concedes that a literal reading of
the note would create such an exception, it declined to accept such a
reading.5 0 The footnote was dismissed as dictum dealing with a hypothetical set of facts not actually passed upon in the Crane decision. 5 1 More importantly, the court viewed the footnote as
inconsistent with its own view that Crane is primarily concerned with
preventing double tax benefits. 52 Of course, the question that the
court failed to address is just what the Supreme Court intended to
have so "obviously" explained by inserting the footnote.
46 See Section II supra.
47 See note 37 supra.
48 577 F.2d at 215.
49 Id

50

Id

51 Id
52 Id at 215-16.
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Tufts

Commissioner53

Tufts v.
presented essentially the same issues as
respect
to
footnote
37. Since the disposition of a partnerAillar with
ship interest was involved, it also raised questions about the proper
construction of certain Code sections in Subchapter K. The Tax
Court 54 followed its own and the Third Circuit's rationale in Millar
with respect to the footnote and extended that rationale in construing the partnership provisions. However, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit totally disagreed with the Mllar interpretation of
Crane and reversed the Tax Court. Thus, the circuits have split and
the stage is set for an eventual reexamination of Crane by the
Supreme Court.
The taxpayer in Tufts was a general partner in a partnership
formed to construct and operate an apartment complex. The construction was financed by a $1.8 million loan secured by a mortgage
note which provided that neither the partnership nor any partner
was personally liable for its repayment. All the partners included
their proportionate shares of $1.8 million liability in the bases for
their partnership interests and made small cash contributions that
were also included in basis. Over a few years of operation, the partnership experienced substantial tax losses, both from operations and
depreciation, which were claimed as deductions by the partners and
which decreased the bases for their partnership interests.
Adverse economic conditions caused the value of the property to
decline to $1.4 million while the principal outstanding on the mortgage remained at $1.8 million. At this point, all the partners sold
their partnership interests to the same unrelated third party who
paid them no consideration (except a $250 reimbursement for their
expenses in the sale). The buyer took the property subject to the
nonrecourse mortgage.
A. The Tax Court Decision
The taxpayers contended that they had no income from the sale
of the property under footnote 37's exception to Crane. The Tax
Court quickly rejected that argument, citing the Third Circuit's Millar decision for two propositions: first, "that the principal reason for
the Crane holding was to prevent the double tax deduction that
would otherwise result;"5 5 and second, that footnote 37 cannot pro53
54
55

651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
70 T.C. 756 (1978).
Id at 765.
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vide an exception to this because "the result would be totally incon'5 6
sistent with the rationale for the holding.
The alternate argument presented by the taxpayers was that
Code section 752(c) expressly compels the same result as would footnote 37 when a partnership interest is sold.5 7 The court agreed that

the language of that section is "broad enough to support the taxpayers' contention.

' 58

However, if the partnership provisions were con-

strued to impose the same outcome that was rejected in Millar, then
the partnership vehicle could be used to accomplish the very result
Crane sought to prohibit. Rather than acquiesce in such an outcome,
the court suggested that the meaning of the statute is "not so clearly
delineated as to preclude reliance upon the legislative history and the
regulations. ' 59 These sources indicated to the court that the fair
market value limitation of section 752(c) was intended to operate
only with respect to determining basis when property was contributed to or distributed from a partnership. It would not then operate
to limit the amount realized on the sale of an interest in a partnership. The court believed this interpretation of the Code to be amply
warranted: "[I]f we accept the petitioners' interpretation of the statute, Congress has, in codifying the Crane doctrine, legislated the very
60
result Crane sought to prohibit."
B.

The Fifth CircuitDecision

The Fifth Circuit completely rejected the Millar view of Crane:
"We do not agree that this concern for double deductions was the
principal reason underlying the Crane decision." 6' The Third Circuit's and Tax Court's reliance on the statement in Crane that the
"crux" of the case concerned these double deductions was in error
because it was read out of context. That statement was primarily a
response to the taxpayer's constitutional argument, appearing at the
end of the opinion ajer the Court had decided the case on wholly
different grounds. The holding in Crane, the court maintained, does
not mandate the inclusion of any previously allowed tax benefits in
the amount realized.62
The court viewed Crane as concluding only that a taxpayer re56 Id at 766.

57 Id
58
59

Id at 768.
Id at 769.

60 Id
61
62

651 F.2d at 1060.
The decision states: "We therefore prefer to read this expression of concern as prima-
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ceives an economic benefit which must be included in the amount realized when property is sold for more than the amount of its
nonrecourse encumbrance. 63 A "compelling reason" why this limited
holding should not be expanded to include strictly tax benefits in
amount realized is the fact that such benefits are already accounted
for through the Code's basis mechanism:
[A]ny tax benefits that the taxpayer may have received in the form
of prior deductions have already been factored into the gain equation through adjustments to basis. Since these deductions have
been accounted for through adjustments to basis, it follows logically
that they cannot also support an expansion of the definition of
amount realized. To account for these deductions twice in the
same equation by expanding the definition of amount realized as
well as adjusting basis downward would, we think, be taxing the
taxpayer twice on the same component of gain. 64
Had the court stopped at this point, its opinion would be less
startling. Readers could have assumed that the court meant that
footnote 37 does create an "obvious" exception to Crane; that there is
no economic benefit derived from abandoning property that is subject to a mortgage greater than its value. However, the court goes on
to question whether there is an economic benefit in the amount of
the debt even if the property is worth more than the mortgage. Finding this underlying economic benefit theory to be "seriously
flawed" 65 led the court to have "serious reservations" about the entire Crane decision. 66 Since Crane is probably wrong, the Fifth Circuit
panel saw no reason to extend it to situations beyond its particular
facts.
The court believed that Crane's economic benefit theory was
flawed because it is based upon the erroneous premise that an owner
of property worth more than its mortgage must "treat the conditions
'67
of the mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations.
This premise, the court was convinced, is valid only if the owner
wants to keep the property. However, once the owner decides to dispose of it, the equivalence between nonrecourse debt and debt carrying personal liability is lost. The court suggested that a person
owning property subject to a nonrecourse debt can transfer it "to a
rily a response to Mrs. Crane's constitutional argument, and not as the principal justification
for the statutory holding that the Court had announced earlier in the opinion." Id
63 Id at 1061.
64 Id
65 Id at 1062.
66 Id at 1063.
67 Id at 1062 (citing 331 U.S. at 14).
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third party with absolutely no regard to that party's willingness or
ability to meet the mortgage obligations, yet rest assured that his
other assets cannot be reached."'6 8 Although it was conceded that in
Crane the taxpayer realized some benefit when the purchaser took the
property subject to the mortgage, the court doubted that the amount
69
of that benefit equalled the amount of the nonrecourse debt.
In a rather rare judicial attempt to achieve clarity, the Fifth Circuit majority thought it necessary to append a lengthy footnote to
' 70 It
the end of its decision "to put this case in its proper perspective.
obviously felt compelled to justify its decision in light of the conflicting case law and commentary asserting that a failure to apply the tax
benefit doctrine of cases like Millar invites abuses of the tax system.
The court's response was that whatever potential for abuse does exist
stems from the inclusion of unrealistically large amounts of nonrecourse debt in basi. "The real crux of the problem," the court maintained, "is the taxpayer's ability to manipulate his basis and adjusted
basis through the use of nonrecourse financing. ' 71 The appropriate
solution to this problem is not to "distort the definition of amount
realized," 7 2 but rather to judicially or legislatively restrict the
amounts includible in the basis against which losses may be
deducted.
V.

The Basis Approach

The portion of the Crane decision concerning adjusted basis
could easily have been read as limited to situations where property is
inherited. In Mayerson v. Commissioner,73 the Internal Revenue Service
advanced the argument that Crane need not be extended beyond that
situation. The adjusted basis at issue in Crane was determined by
reference to the fair market value of the property, while in cases of
purchases and other acquisitions, basis is determined with reference
to cost. The Tax Court, however, believed that the reasoning for
Crane was equally applicable to purchases. This conclusion appdars
to have been based on the notion that the ultimate concern of Crane
was for depreciation policy. That policy is well summarized in the
Tax Court's decision in Mayerson:
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id at 1062.
Id at 1063.
Id at 1063 n.9.
Id
Id
47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq., 1969-1 C.B. 21.
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Taxpayers who are not personally liable for encumbrances on property should be allowed depreciation deductions affording competitive equality with taxpayers who are personally liable for
encumbrances or taxpayers who own unencumbered property. The
effect of such a policy is to give the taxpayer an advance credit for
the amount of the mortgage. This appears to be reasonable since it
can be assumed that a capital investment in the amount of the
mortgage74 will eventually occur despite the absence of personal
liability.
Whatever the desirability of putting nonrecourse mortgagors on
a par with other property owners with respect to depreciation deductions, one may question whether it is reasonable to assume that an
investment equal to the nonrecourse mortgage will eventually be
made. Certainly it becomes highly questionable when the amount of
the mortgage to be included in basis exceeds the value of the underlying property. Nevertheless, in Brountas v. Commissioner,75 the Tax
Court felt constrained by its own decisions in Millar and Tufts to include the full amounts of nonrecourse notes in basis in such a situation. The Fifth Circuit, faced with essentially identical facts in Gibson
Products v. UnitedStates, 76 indicated that it would limit the liabilities
includible in basis to no more than the value of the property securing
the debts.
Both cases dealt with limited partnerships that purchased interests in oil and gas leaseholds and drilling contracts. Large portions of
the purchase prices were in the form of nonrecourse notes payable
solely out of profits from future oil and gas production. Since these
profits were highly speculative, the face amounts of the notes greatly
exceeded the fair market values of the oil and gas interests securing
them. The cases thus presented two issues to the courts: first,
whether these nonrecourse notes were actually "liabilities" of the
partnership includible in the bases of the partners for their partnership interests; and second, assuming they were liabilities, whether the
amount includible in basis is limited to the fair market value of the
security.
In Brountas, the Tax Court held that the nonrecourse notes had
value and commercial reality and thus would be treated as true liabilities for the purchase price. The court concluded that the reasoning of Crane and its own reasoning in Tufts (which it viewed as a
74

47 T.C. at 352.

75
76

73 T.C. 491 (1979).
637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981).
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"lineal descendent of Crane"77) mandate inclusion of the full amounts
of the nonrecourse notes in the taxpayers' bases. "The Crane doctrine," the court stated, "is basically a symmetrical one - a taxpayer
includes nonrecourse liabilities in his basis, but he must also include
such liabilities in the amount he realizes upon disposition of the encumbered property.

' 78

Such symmetry requires inclusion of thefull

amount of liabilities in basis because the court had already held that
the full amount is included in amount realized; there is no fair market value limitation on either side of the equation.
The Fifth Circuit's holding in Gibson illustrates the approach it
would take to control the tax abuses that result from the use of
nonrecourse financing. Because the notes were not secured by sufficient assets, and payment was contingent on oil and gas production,
the court concluded that the notes did not represent true loans.
Before this court would accept Mayerson's assumption that a nonrecourse mortgagor will eventually invest an amount equal to the liability in the property, there must be "a reasonable basis for the
prediction that the ability of the borrower to repay will not be wholly
contingent upon the success or failure of the business venture. ' 79
By finding no true partnership liabilities, the court was not re77 73 T.C. at 573.
78 Id at 574.
79 637 F.2d at 1047 (quoting Fielder, Drilling Funds and Nonrecourse Loans - Some Tax
Questions, in 24th SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION INSTITUTE ON OIL & GAS TAXATION 527, 534 (1973)). The Fifth Circuit cited Gibson in its Tufts decision as representing the
appropriate solution to the problems of potential tax abuse posed by cases like Tufts and
Millar. The decision in Tufts also alluded to the fact that Congress has already acted to curb
much of this abuse by enacting I.R.C. § 465. See 651 F.2d at 1063-64 n.9. Section 465 was
legislated to control a rapidly expanding tax shelter industry. Most shelters depend upon the
high leverage and low risk provided by nonrecourse financing. The Crane doctrine would
allow these obligations to be included in the basis of limited partnership interests or the basis
of interests in other similar ventures in proportion to the amount of an investor's actual cash
contribution. These out-of-pocket contributions were usually relatively small. Thus, each
partner could take depreciation and other deductions greatly in excess of the amounts actually invested. Congress' solution in 1976 was to limit a taxpayer's allowable deductions to
amounts that were actually "at risk" in the venture, notwithstanding the amount of "loss"
actually sustained.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 applied these loss limitations to certain specified activities
that were viewed as particularly prone to tax shelter abuse. These activities were motion
picture production, farming, equipment leasing and oil and gas exploration and production.
A special provision was applied to partnerships by I.R.C. § 704(d) to exclude, from the basis
of a partner's partnership interest, for purposes of deducting losses from the venture, any
partnership liabilities for which the partner had no personal liability. Thus, after 1976, most
of the deductions taken by the taxpayers in Brounias and Gibson would not have been allowed.
The Revenue Act of 1978 expanded the § 465 limitations to all activities and thus the specific
partnership provision of § 704(d) was no longer required. Current § 465 continues to exempt
the "holding" of real estate from its loss limitation rules.
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quired to decide the extent to which nonrecourse partnership liabilities may be included in the basis of a partnership interest. In a
footnote, however, the court certainly indicated its probable holding
on the Subchapter K question:
While not deciding the issue, we regard the district court's reasoning persuasive in concluding that the nonrecourse indebtedness of a
partnership can be included in a partner's basis only to the extent
that it equals or exceeds the market value of the property securing
the debt.8 0
VI.

The Tax Benefit Approach

It is clear that the Tax Court and Second and Third Circuits
have established a new judicial tax benefit rule based upon language
found in Crane.8 1 Some commentators who disagree with the original
premise of Crane, or with the subsequent interpretation used by some
courts, would still support a tax benefit analysis in order to prevent
tax abuse.8 2 Professor Bittker, for example, who was quoted at
length by the Fifth Circuit in Tufis for his criticisms of Crane's logic,
supports the tax benefit through the making of a "balancing
83
entry.",,
In Estate ofDelman v. Commissioner,8 4 another footnote 37 fact pattern, the Tax Court was confronted with this very tax benefit argu80 637 F.2d at 1045 n.8. The court has obviously misstated its intended meaning. What
is actually meant is that nonrecourse debt can be included in basis only to the extent of the
value of the property securing the debt. That was the holding of the district court the footnote refers to. See 460 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Tex. 1978). The Internal Revenfie Service has
also adopted this position. In Rev. Rul. 81-278, 1981-2 I.R.B. 10, the Service ruled that a
nonrecourse note is not includible in the basis of a partnership interest nor in the partnership's basis for contributed property where the fair market value of the property securing the
note did not at least approximate the amount of the note.
81 It is certainly clear to the Fifth Circuit. In its Gibson opinion that court sums up Millar
and the Tax Court's opinion in Tufts succinctly: "Both Tull- and Millar are tax benefit
cases." 637 F.2d at 1045 n.8.
82 See Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realieed Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tar Eete
in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1969); Rollyson, Recent Cases and Ruling, 3 J.
REAL EST. TAX. 495 (1976); A. WILLIS, 1 PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 87 (2d ed. Cum. Supp.
1981).
83 Bittker, Tax Shelters, supra note 4 at 28. Professor Bittker adopts a "balancing entry"
theory: "[T]he result in Crane can be justified only if the amount realized by a taxpayer who
disposes of property encumbered by nonrecourse debt in excess of its basis is viewed as a
balancing entry, which brings the tax results into conformity with economic reality."
In a final footnote to his article, Professor Bittker indicates that "the economic benefit
theory should be rejected as wholly fallacious, in order to make way for a more comprehensive balancing entry theory." Id at 284-85 n.14.
84 73 T.C. 15 (1979).
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ment. The taxpayer contended that Millar was wrongly decided
under the weight of authority of cases dealing with the traditional
tax benefit rule.8 5 These cases would require an actual receipt of
funds or the discharge of a liability that would increase a taxpayer's
net worth before any income results. 8 6 The discharge of a nonrecourse liability secured by property worth less than the liability
would not, of course, increase a taxpayer's net worth. The Tax
Court's response was simple - those cases do not apply to dispositions of property subject to nonrecourse liability. The tax benefit
87
rule envisioned by Crane is of a different order.
Apparently, the court in Delman does not maintain that the
Crane doctrine will include nonrecourse liabilities in amount realized
even though there has been no tax benefit from including the liability in basis. Responding to the taxpayer's argument that there was
no evidence that any individual partners enjoyed tax benefits flowing
from partnership losses, the court stated that the benefit can be inferred from the facts in the case.8 8 Specifically left open is whether
the amount realized by any particular partner would include his
share of nonrecourse liability if he could establish that he actually
achieved no tax savings from the partnership.
85 This rule has developed through case law and has been partially codified in I.R.C.
§ 111. Under the Code provision, gross income does not include income attributable to the
recovery of bad debts, prior taxes or delinquencies except to the extent that a deduction with
respect to these items resulted in a "tax benefit"in a prior tax year. Treas. Reg. § 1.111(a)
(1956) extends the rule to "all other losses, expenditures, and accruals. . . ." Conversely,
gross income includes recoveries of these amounts, which would otherwise be nontaxable returns of capital, to the extent that a deduction in a prior year resulted in a tax savings.
However, it is not merely the tax savings that is included in income, but the amount of the
deduction that yielded the benefit. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399
(Ct. Cl. 1967). Thus, the actual tax paid may be more or less than the tax savings depending
upon the applicable tax rates.
86 In South Lake Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963), the Ninth
Circuit refused to apply the rule to a liquidation under I.R.C. § 336 to tax the corporation on
a benefit where the money was actually recouped by the shareholders after the liquidation.
However, in Tennesse-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979), the Sixth Circuit concluded that the tax benefit rule could
apply even though there was no actual physical recovery of an asset or sum. Accord, First
Trust & Say. Bank v. United States, 614 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1980). But in Tufr, the Fifth
Circuit appears to reject the application of the tax benefit rule to include depreciation deductions taken in prior years in income upon disposition of the depreciated property. 651 F.2d at
1061. Such "recapture" is already provided for by the adjustment to basis made with respect
to depreciation deductions. "In contrast," the court maintained, "the tax benefit rule is
designed only to prevent the taxpayer from making actual personal gains through unwarranted
deductions." 651 F.2d at 1061 n.6 (emphasis added).
87 73 T.C. at 30 n.3.
88 Id at 30 n.4.
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Notwithstanding the large portion of the Crane opinion devoted
to describing the economic benefit to the taxpayer, the Tax Court in
Delman was quite direct in asserting that a tax benefit alone would
support its holding. This assertion was made in response to the taxpayer's contention that the Tax Court in Millar and Tufts was not
justified in relying on cases like Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner,89 Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner,90 and Lutz & Schramm Co. v.
Commissioner,91 where the taxpayers had economically benefitted
from post-acquisition borrowing. Although these cases were cited by
the court for support in Millar and Tufts, they are factually and conceptually quite distinguishable. 9 2 Since the mortgages in those cases
were taken out after the securing property was acquired, there was no
resulting increase in basis. Thus, there was no need to consider
whether it was necessary to the "symmetry" of Crane to include the
amount of the mortgages in the amount realized. Instead, the borrowings were viewed as nontaxable advanced receipts on a later,
final, taxable disposition. 93 The fact that the taxpayers had unrestricted use of the borrowed funds was seen as an economic benefit
rather than a tax benefit.
VII.

Conclusion

Unquestionably, the Fifth Circuit in Tufts provides a more accurate analysis of what Crane actually says - and perhaps of what the
Supreme Court intended to say. It is also clear that Crane tried to
create an economic equivalence between recourse and nonrecourse
debt that simply does not exist. In the final analysis, however, Crane
was not an economics case. Therefore, Crane must be read in light of
its decision on the technical tax question before the Court and the
effect of that decision on the entire tax system.
At the outset, the Court noted that the taxpayer had benefitted
from large depreciation deductions and that the amount of gain she
would recognize under its decision would just equal the aggregate of
these deductions. 94 Thus, Crane z" a tax benefit case and must be
viewed as such. While Millar does not have as much support in the
language of Crane as does Tufts, Milar is much better supported by
89

16 T.C. 649 (1951), af'd, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).

90 9 T.C. 320 (1947).
91 1 T.C. 682 (1943), nonacq., 1943 C.B. 35.
92 See McGuire, Negative Capital Accounts and the Failing Tax Shelter, 3 J. REAL EST. TAX.
439 (1976).
93 See Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d at 359.
94 331 U.S. at 12.
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the actual holding. The confusion about the "principal reasoning" of
Crane stems from the Court's unsuccessful attempt to provide a nontax rationale for what was essentially a pure tax decision.
What of footnote 37? The Mi/lar court put this question in its
proper perspective by describing the footnote as "involving a clearly
different time and clearly different legal circumstances. '95 Whatever
the Supreme Court actually had in mind when it appended that note
to its decision is forever lost to legal history and is now only speculation. What is known is that Crane'sallowance of nonrecourse debt in
computing adjusted basis has created a great many obstacles to providing a fair and administrable tax system. It would be unfortunate
96
if a footnote would hinder the removal of some of these obstacles.

95 577 F.2d at 215.
96 It appears likely that the Treasury Department will seek legislative reversal of Tufls.
In an address to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Conference on Federal Taxes in October, 1981, the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy announced that this matter was one of the major legislative areas being considered for submission to Congress. Taxes
on Parade, Release No. 54, STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH) (Nov.4, 1981).

